Humanity as the Image of God
Published in On the Way to the Postmodern: Old Testament Essays 1967-1998, Volume 2 (JSOTSup, 292; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), pp. 447-97 Originally published as 'The Image of God in Man', Tyndale Bulletin 19 (1968), pp. 53-103.The Old Testament references to the concept of humanity as the image of God are tantalizing in their brevity and scarcity; we Þnd only the fundamental sentence in Gen. 1.26 'Let us make humanity in our image after our likeness', a further reference to humankind's creation 'in the likeness of God' in Gen. 5.2, and a Þnal statement in Gen. 9.6: 'Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall his blood be shed; for God made humanity in his own image'. Yet we become aware, in reading these early chapters of Genesis and in studying the history of the interpretation of these passages, that the importance of the concept is out of all proportion to the laconic treatment it receives in the Old Testament./1/
One essential meaning of the statement that humanity was created 'in the image of God' is plain: it is that humans are in some way and in some degree like God. Even if the similarity between humanity and God could not be deÞned more precisely, the signiÞcance of this statement of the nature of humankind for the understanding of biblical thought could not be over-emphasized. Humankind is the one godlike creature in all the created order. Its nature is not understood if it is viewed merely as the most highly developed of the animals, with whom it shares the earth, nor is it perceived if it is seen as an inÞnitesimal being dwarfed by the enormous magnitude of the universe. By the concept of the image of God, Genesis afÞrms the dignity and worth of humanity, and elevates all humans-not just kings or nobles-to the highest status conceivable, short of complete divinization.
There is perhaps in the concept of the 'image' a slight hint of the limitation of the status of humankind, in that the image is not itself the thing it represents and that the copy must in some respects be unlike its original./2/ Yet this limiting aspect of biblical anthropology is hardly to be recognized as an important element in the 'image' concept, which itself points unequivocally to the dignity and godlikeness of humanity. It is the context of the 'image' concept that conveys the complementary view of human nature: that humanity is 'made' in the image of God, that is, that it is God's creature, subject to the overlordship of its Maker. Genesis 1, with its overriding emphasis on the unconditional freedom of God's sovereignty, leaves no doubt that humankind is a creature of God at the same time as it is 'in the image of God'.
Yet even if the essential meaning of the image is clear, namely that humanity's splendour is its likeness to God, we still need to know in what respect humanity is like God. Obviously the fact that it is 'made' in the image of God, that is, that it is a creature, imposes limitations upon the range and degree of its similarities to God. What these limitations are and what the precise meaning of the 'image' is will be the subject of this paper. Only by considering what meaning such a phrase could have had to the author of Genesis 1, and not at all by working from general philosophical, religious, or even biblical indications of the likeness of humanity and God, can we discover in what exact sense we may use the term.
1. The History of Interpretation of the Image of God
It has proved all too easy in the history of interpretation for this exceedingly open-ended term 'the image of God' to be pressed into the service of contemporary philosophical and religious thought. Karl Barth has shown in his survey of the history of the concept how each interpreter has given content to it from the anthropology and theology of his own age./3/ For Ambrose, the soul was the image; for Athanasius, rationality, in the light of the Logos doctrine; for Augustine, under the inþuence of trinitarian dogma, the image is to be seen as the triune faculties of the soul, memoria, intellectus, amor. For the Reformers/4/ it was the state of original righteousness enjoyed by Adam before the Fall, the 'entire excellence of human nature' including 'everything in which the nature of man surpasses that of all other species of animals', which since the Fall is 'vitiated and almost destroyed, nothing remaining but a ruin, confused, mutilated, and tainted with impurity'./5/ For the time of the Enlightenment, the seat of the image is the soul, of which Herder exclaimed: 'It is the image of the Godhead and seeks to stamp this image upon everything around it; it makes the manifold one, seeks truth in falsehood, radiant activity and operation in unstable peace, and is always present and wills and rules as though it looks at itself and says: "Let us", with the exalted feeling of being the daughter and the image of God'./6/ Barth concludes his catalogue with the sardonic remark: 'One could indeed discuss which of all these and similar explanations of the term is the most beautiful or the most deep or the most serious. One cannot, however, discuss which of them is the correct interpretation of Genesis 1:26.'/7/
Old Testament scholarship has produced an equally varied range of interpretations of the image. J.J. Stamm, in surveying the history of interpretation,/8/ has drawn a dividing line in 1940. Before that date four groups of views may be discerned: (i) The image is a spiritual quality of humanity: its self-consciousness and self-determination (Delitzsch), its talents and understanding of the eternal, the true, and the good (Dillmann), its self-consciousness, its capability for thought and its immortality (König), its reason (Heinisch), its personality (Procksch, Sellin), its vitality and innate nobility (B. Jacob)./9/ (ii) The image consists in humankind's rule over their fellow-creatures (Holzinger, Koehler in 1936, Hempel). (iii) The image is the term for the immedi-ate relationship between God and humanity (Vischer). (iv) The image consists in the human form, which is similar to God's (Gunkel, von Rad in 1935).
Since 1940, according to Stamm's analysis, Gunkel's view of the image as external form, a view which could be distinguished as an under-current even in writers such as Dillmann and Procksch, who stress rather the spiritual character of the image, came to the fore and dominated Old Testament scholarship. The physical meaning of µlx was emphasized in an inþuential paper by P. Humbert, who concluded from a study of µlx and twmd in the Old Testament that the phrase wntwmdk wnmlxb 'in our image according to our likeness' in Gen. 1.26 means that humanity was created 'with the same physical form as the deity, of which [it] is a moulded three-dimensional embodiment, delineated and exteriorized'./10/ L. Koehler similarly considered, in examining the use of µlx in other Semitic languages, that µlx is primarily an upright statue, and that the image of God is to be seen primarily in humankind's upright posture, and more generally, in the creation of humanity according to God's µlx, that is, his image in the sense of form./11/
There emerge, therefore, if we take the whole history of interpretation into account, two quite distinct approaches to the meaning of the image. The Þrst, which has been dominant throughout the history of biblical interpretation, locates the image in some spiritual quality or faculty of the human person. If the image refers primarily to similarity between God and humanity, it is only to be expected that the image will be identiÞed with that part of the human person that is shared with God, namely the spirit. It would appear that no further arguments at this late date could increase the attractiveness of this interpretation; for it is plain from the setting of the image concept at the apex of the pyramidal structure of the creation narrative and from the solemnity of the statement of divine deliberation with which it is introduced that we have here no mere obiter dictum about humanity but a carefully considered theologoumenon which adequately expresses the superlative dignity and spiritual capacities of humanity. On the other hand, recent biblical scholarship has been well-nigh unanimous in rejecting the traditional view of humanity as a 'composition' of various 'parts', and has emphasized rather that in the biblical view humanity is essentially a unity./12/ When this insight is applied to the concept of the image, it is difÞcult to resist the conclusion that the whole person is in the image of God.
The force of the second approach, which leads to a physical interpretation of the image, is not always well appreciated. Gen. 1.26 makes it clear that it is by the image of God that humanity is distinguished from all the animals, which share with it the sixth day as the moment of their creation. One of the chief distinguishing marks of humanity in relation to the animals is the upright posture, as was already recognized in antiquity. So Ovid:Os homini sublime dedit, caelumque videre
Jussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus./13/In Dryden's paraphrase:
Thus, while the mute Creation downward bend
Their Sight, and to their Earthy Mother tend,
Man looks aloft; and with erected Eyes,
Beholds his own Hereditary Skies./14/We do not, however, need to specify the upright posture of humans as their chief distinguishing characteristic in order to propose a physical interpretation.
It could be suggested that the earliest interpretation of the image in physical terms was by the 'P' writer himself, when he spoke of Seth's being born according to the image (µlxk) of Adam (5.3). It would indeed seem that it is the physical resemblance of father and son that is in view here, and if the difÞcult expression in Gen. 1.26 is to be interpreted by the comparatively clear reference in 5.3, as H. Gunkel suggested,/15/ a strong case for a physical meaning of the image develops. We may Þnally note here the quite remarkable statements of Calvin:I deny not that external shape, in so far as it distinguishes and separates us from the lower animals, brings us nearer to God; nor will I vehemently oppose any who may choose to include under the image of God [the lines of Ovid quoted above]./16/ . . . Though the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and the heart, or in the soul and its powers, there was no part even of the body in which some rays of glory did not shine./17/
We should, however, observe that hidden below the surface of the deÞnition of the image as upright posture or physical form there often lies a theological signiÞcance. H. Gunkel's own form of words is revealing in this respect: 'This being made in the image of God refers in the Þrst place to the body of humanity, without indeed excluding the spiritual'./18/ Even the upright posture of humans is not simply a mark of difference from the animals; it indicates the superiority of humans over the animals, and is seen by some also as a token of the human capacity to commune with God./19/ So, for example, H. Wheeler Robinson could write that the natural meaning of Gen. 1.26 was that
the bodily form of man was made after the pattern of the bodily form of God (the substance being different) . . . No doubt, writers so late as those of the Priestly Code thought not only of man's bodily shape and erect posture as distinguishing him from the animals, but also of his obvious mental and spiritual differentiae from the animal world. But this was not expressed by the words 'image' and 'likeness'; it was implied in the psychology which did not divorce body and soul, but conceived the body psychically./20/
Certain writers in recent years have sought to combine both a spiritual and physical reference in the word µlx. G. von Rad writes: 'One does well to separate as little as possible the bodily and spiritual; the whole man is created in the image of God'./21/ According to E. Jacob, humanity's representative function is what is principally implied by the image, and he stresses that the human person is a representative of God in its total being, physical and spiritual./22/ H. Gross similarly has argued that Old Testament anthropology does not permit one to divide between soul and body when considering the image./23/ A novel approach along the same line has been made by B. de Geradon, according to whom the image is to be found in the human possession of heart, tongue, and limbs, which corresponds to the divine faculty of thought, speech, and act./24/
On the other hand, some have recently denied strongly that the physical nature of humanity can form any part of the image, H.H. Rowley on the ground that Yahweh is not conceived of in the Old Testament as having a physical form,/25/ and P.G. Duncker on the ground that 'P's' conception of the transcendence of God would have precluded him from speaking of the corporeality of God, which would furthermore have to be bisexual if both male and female are created in the physical likeness of God./26/ This rejection of a physical interpretation leads once again to the deÞnition of the image as some quality that is shared with God: intelligence and power (Duncker),/27/ self-consciousness and self-determination (Festorazzi),/28/ spiritual nature (Rowley),/29/ thought and conscience (Cassuto)./30/
A quite fresh and provocative interpretation has been advanced by Karl Barth,/31/ following hints from W. Vischer/32/ and D. Bonhoeffer./33/ He Þnds in the text of Gen. 1.26-28 two starting-points: Þrst, the plural of Gen. 1.26, which he considers can only be understood as a 'summons to intradivine unanimity of intention and decision';/34/ that is, that there is within God himself a distinction between the I and the Thou. This is not a return to the old dogmatic trinitarian interpretation,/35/ but an attempt to take seriously the plural of Gen. 1.26 and to use it positively in exegesis instead of labouring under it as an encumbrance that has to be disposed of before the meaning of the image can be apprehended. Secondly, that 'Male and female he created them' (1.27a) must be recognized as 'the deÞnitive explanation given by the text itself' of the image of God./36/ The relation and distinction in humankind between male and female, man and wife, corresponds to the relation and distinction of the I and Thou in God himself. There is thus between God and humanity an analogia relationis; and God's image in humanity is the reciprocal relationship of human being with human being./37/ It thus appears that the individual person is not the image of God, since the image comes to expression in the 'juxtaposition and conjunction of man and man which is that of male and female'./38/ Barth, however, when he comes to describe the image employs a wider formulation, which refers it to the individual person: as bearer of the image the human person is partner of God himself, capable of dealings with him and of close relationship with him. The human person is a being whom God addresses as Thou and makes answerable as I./39/ Thus the image describes the IThou relationship between person and person and between a person and God.
Barth's understanding of the image has received qualiÞed support from a number of Old Testament scholars. F. Horst sees the meaning of the image in humanity's personhood, which has 'the character of a Thou addressed by God and I answerable to God'./40/ He does not accept Barth's view of a distinction within God of the I and Thou to which the IThou relationship of man and woman is analogous, and he puts in its place an analogy between the relation of humanity and God and that of man and woman. Horst makes an interesting, though not entirely convincing, addition of his own to the meaning of the image when he speaks of it as having a conditional character: 'Man is person, is image of God, in so far as he is man who hears the word of God, who speaks with God in prayer and obeys him in service'. N. Krieger similarly suggests that 'the image is conditioned by the obedience of the human person'./41/ J.J. Stamm attempts to effect some co-ordination between Barth's view and the tendency of modern Old Testament scholarship, and Þnds such a co-ordination possible through the rejection of the image as some spiritual or moral quality in humanity, and the afÞrmation of its meaning as the personality of humanity in its relationship with God./42/
It appears that scholarship has reached something of an impasse over the problem of the image, in that different starting-points, all of which seem to be legitimate, lead to different conclusions. If one begins from the philological evidence, the image is deÞned in physical terms. If we begin from the incorporeality of God, the image cannot include the human body. If we begin with the Hebrew conception of human nature as a unity, we cannot separate, in such a fundamental sentence about humanity, the spiritual part of humanity from the physical. If we begin with 'male and female' as a deÞnitive explanation of the image, the image can only be understood in terms of personal relationships, and the image of God must be located in humankind (if not rather in married couples!) rather than the individual person.
2. The Problem of the Plural in Genesis 1.26
Since Barth has raised once again the problem of the plural 'let us' in Gen. 1.26, which has proved an embarrassment to exegetes/43/ ever since the time of the Jewish scholars who were said to have produced for King Ptolemy the 'corrected' version 'let me',/44/ I should clarify my position on the question before embarking on the subject of the image itself. The meaning of the plural in Gen. 1.26 is, to be sure, peripheral to the interpretation of the image; nevertheless it is not without value to enquire 'In whose image is humanity made?' Who are the 'us' of Gen. 1.26?
Those who are impressed by the theological statements of ecumenical councils will have little difÞculty with this plural, for the First Council of Sirmium in 351 ce not only afÞrmed that the faciamus ('let us make') of Gen. 1.26 was addressed by the Father to the Son as a distinct Person, but also excommunicated those who denied it!/45/ I set beside this statement those of two modern Catholic exegetes:The Old Testament reader can recognize here no 'vestigium Trinitatis' ./46/
Whoever understands the verse of the trinity forgets that Genesis 1 is part of the Old Testament./47/
I can only agree that it is the primary task of the Old Testament exegete to expound the sense intended by the author of the passage and that such was not the sense needs no proof. Yet that is not necessarily to deny that the interpretation of the plural as a reference to the Trinity has some validity; a Christian exegesis that sees here the co-operation of the Godhead in the work of creation may well be a possibility. What is important is not to lay down in advance the form that such compatability will assume. In brief, we cannot explain the plural of Gen. 1.26 as a reference to the Trinity.
Many explanations of the plural verb 'let us make' have been offered: I will review these suggestions in what seems to me to be an ascending order of probability.A. An Unassimilated Fragment of Myth
Isolated from its setting in Genesis 1, v. 26a would read very naturally as an address by one god to another in preparation for the creation of humanity. When we turn to some ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies, and discover that the creation of humans is frequently the outcome of conversation between the gods, the possibility that Gen. 1.26 reproduces some traditional mythological expression becomes attractive./48/ Thus in Enuma elish:Marduk's heart prompts him to fashion artful works.
Opening his mouth, he addresses Ea,
To impart the plan he had conceived in his heart . . .
'I will establish a savage, "man" shall be his name" . . . '
Ea answered him, speaking a word to him,
To relate to him a scheme for the relief of the gods./49/A Sumerian text depicts Nammu, the primordial sea-goddess, urging her son Enki, god of wisdom and water, to create humans to relieve the gods from their toil:
O my son, rise from thy bed, from thy . . . work what is wise,
Fashion servants of the gods, may they produce their . . . /50/
Enki thereupon gives instructions for the fashioning of humankind. The Old Babylonian Atrahasis Epic, describing the creation of humans by Mami the mother-goddess, similarly narrates a conversation between the gods./51/ The closest parallel of all occurs in an Assyrian text that represents the Annunaki as discussing among themselves what may be created next now that the world itself has been made:What (else) shall we do?
What (else) shall we create? . . .
Let us slay (two) Lamga gods.
With their blood let us create mankind./52/Neverthless, it seems extremely unlikely, in spite of the superÞcial similarity of these texts, that the use of the plural in Gen. 1.26 is in any way dependent on such mythological descriptions. If the author of Genesis 1 was in every other instance able to remove all trace of polytheism from the traditional material he was handling, as he is generally agreed to have done,/53/ why did he not manage to expunge the plural of 'let us'? Did he not realize the contradiction between 'let us' and 'God created' (v. 27; arbyw singular verb)? On general grounds one cannot but agree with G. von Rad, who writes of Genesis 1:
Nothing is here by chance; everything must be considered carefully, deliberately, and precisely. It is false, therefore, to reckon here even occasionally with archaic and half-mythological rudiments . . . What is said here is intended to hold true entirely and exactly as it stands./54/
If the plural is here, it is here deliberately, not as some dimly recalled or partly digested fragment of mythology.
B. Address to Creation
This view, which was held by some mediaeval Jewish scholars,/55/ but Þnds little support today,/56/ at least has the merit of taking the plural seriously and of looking for some subject mentioned already in Genesis 1 who will co-operate with God in his work of creation. Maimonides argued, along these lines, that God addressed himself to the earth, which was to bring forth the human body from the earthly elements, while God himself was to produce the spiritual part of humanity's being. 'In our image' thus means in the likeness of both earth and God.
If this interpretation were correct, Gen. 1.26 would form a very interesting parallel to Gen. 2.7, where the man is formed out of earthy material and divine inbreathing. Yet it is surely rather strange that the earth should be invited by God to co-operate with him as a partner in the work of creation; it would also be anomalous that the earth should be spoken of in the third person in v. 24 and included in the Þrst person in v. 26. There is the further difÞculty that the supposed share by the earth in the work of creation is not mentioned in v. 27, where God alone is the creator.C. Plural of Majesty
While there seem clearly to be plurals of majesty in nouns in Hebrew-µyhla being the best-known example/57/-there do not appear to be any certain examples of such plurals in verbs or pronouns. Gen. 11.7 'Come, let us go down and confuse their language' may be one, but it seems rather to be an ironic mocking by God of the tower-builders who have said, 'Come, let us build ourselves a city' (v. 4). In Isa. 6.8 'Whom shall I send and who will go for us?', Yahweh may be thought to speak of himself in the plural, but 'us' more probably includes the heavenly court who are speciÞcally described in the earlier verses of the chapter. The royal plural has been discovered by some in Ezra 4.18: 'The letter which you sent to us has been read before me',/58/ but more probably 'us' means 'my government' or 'my court', and 'me' equals 'me personally', so in fact 'us' is here not really a plural of majesty. The word µyhla, which normally is construed with a singular verb when referring to Yahweh, does occasionally take a plural verb, but such instances are usually patient of an explanation other than the plural of majesty. For example, Abraham tells Abimelech in Gen. 20.13: 'God caused me to wander (w[th) from my father's house', using the plural form possibly out of deference to Abimelech's presumed polytheistic views. When Joshua tells the Israelites in Josh. 24.19 'You cannot serve Yahweh, for he is a holy God (µyvwdq µyhla)' he is perhaps using the plural sarcastically, since he has just encouraged the people, if they are unwilling to serve Yahweh, to choose which of the pagan gods they are acquainted with they will worship.
I conclude that the explanation of the plural of Gen. 1.26 as a plural of majesty is not convincing in that there are few or no parallels in verbs or pronouns in the Old Testament.D. Address to the Heavenly Court
We have already noticed one instance (Isa. 6.8) where Yahweh includes his heavenly court within an 'us'; many references depicting Yahweh as a king surrounded by couriers, sometimes themselves called µyhla, may be found in the Old Testament,/59/ so it would seem natural to take the plural here as inclusive of the heavenly beings. Many modern scholars accept that this is the correct explanation of the plural./60/
This view, however, suffers from some serious difÞculties. It would imply that humanity was made in the image of the µyhla as well as of God himself ('in our image');/61/ it would mean that the µyhla shared in the creation of humanity ('let us make'); there would be a conþict between the plural of v. 26 and the singular of v. 27; there has been no previous mention of the heavenly court in the chapter;/62/ and, for what it is worth, there is no other place in the 'P' strand of the Pentateuch where angels or heavenly court are mentioned./63/
We can hardly avoid the difÞculty by adopting the ingenious rabbinic explanation that humanity was not actually made by the angels in their image, for after God afforded them the opportunity, they declined, on the grounds that this was too important a creative act for them to be associated with, whereupon God created humanity without their help in his own image alone./64/
If 'we' includes the heavenly court, humanity must be made in the image of the µyhla. Von Rad argues thus: the plural is 'to prevent one from referring God's image too closely to Yahweh. By including himself in the heavenly court, he conceals himself in this majority.'/65/ But we may ask why an author who was too sensitive to write 'I will make humanity in my image' proceeded to say in the next verse 'God created humanity in his image'./66/
The force of the further objection, that the µyhla would be said to have shared in humanity's creation,/67/ is seldom recognized by those scholars who see the heavenly court here. The Old Testament quite consistently represents creation as the act of Yahweh alone,/68/ and we cannot evade the force of 'let us' by explaining it as a mere consultation before the work of creation begins. I agree with K. Barth:[Gen. 1.26] does not speak of a mere entourage, of a divine court or council which later disappears behind the king who alone acts. Those addressed here are not merely consulted by the one who speaks but are summoned to an act . . . of creation . . . in concert with the One who speaks./69/
One point in favour of an identiÞcation of 'us' with the µyhla is the appearance of µyhla in Psalm 8, which bears very close afÞnities with Gen. 1.26. Here humanity is created a little lower than µyhla, which could be interpreted as meaning a little lower than the µyhla of the heavenly court./70/ However, even if this is the correct understanding of Psalm 8, it is not necessary to Þnd the same reference in Genesis 1, and it would seem that in general the difÞculties involved in this interpretation of the plural outweigh the superÞcial suitability of the identiÞcation.
E. Self-Deliberation or Self-Summons
It may reasonably be argued that since no other beings have been mentioned in Genesis 1, God must be addressing himself./71/ Self-address (or 'self-objectivization') is not uncommon in the Old Testament (e.g. Ps. 42.5); but it is extremely rare to Þnd a plural form in such a case.
We do indeed in colloquial English use the Þrst person plural in self-encouragement, e.g. 'Let's see', and L. Koehler has noted similar uses in Swiss German./72/ Can such a use be found in Hebrew? A most unlikely source provides a close parallel: Song of Songs 1.9-11 'I compare you, my love, to a mare of Pharaoh's chariots . . . Let us make [hc[n, as in Gen. 1.26] ornaments of gold studded with silver'./73/ The lover here speaks of himself in the Þrst person plural. Perhaps we have here colloquial language, but if so, it is strange to Þnd it in Genesis 1. A similar usage is to be found in 2 Sam. 24.14, where David speaks of himself in the plural: 'Let us fall (hlpn) into the hand of the Lord . . . but into the hand of men let me not fall (hlpa)'./74/ Perhaps we could add Gen. 11.7: 'Let us go down'.
The rarity of parallels gives us little conÞdence in the correctness of this view, but it has the great advantage that it removes the difÞculty of the singular of v. 27. According to this view, God says 'Let us' in v. 26 simply because this is an idiomatic way of expressing self-encouragement or self-deliberation. If we accept this view, it will not be for its merits, but for its comparative lack of disadvantages.F. Duality within the Godhead
It is only because other solutions prove so unsatisfactory that I suggest, with some hesitation, an explanation that raises as many problems as it solves, but nevertheless seems no worse than the other possibilities, and may furthermore be turned to good account in the exposition of the meaning of the image, as we shall later see.
K. Barth, indeed, has been very bold in seeing here a plurality within the deity, a 'unanimity of intention and plan'./75/ In my view, he is incorrect in linking this with the 'male and female' of v. 27, which he regards as deÞnitive of the image./76/ But perhaps he has correctly seen something in v. 26 that Old Testament scholars have not seen, partly through reaction to the trinitarian interpretation, partly through the difÞculty of reconciling duality or plurality in the deity with the strict monotheist faith.
Barth, however, does not specify who God's partner here is; but it can be suggested that God is addressing his spirit, who has appeared in v. 2 in a prominent though usually little understood role (it is not simply a 'mighty wind'),/77/ and has curiously disappeared from the work of creation thereafter. In other Old Testament passages, however, the spirit is the agent of creation, e.g. Job 33.4: 'The spirit of God has made me, and the breath of Shaddai gives me life'; Ps. 104.30: 'When you send forth your spirit they [animals] are created'; cf. also Ezekiel 37 (valley of dry bones and the recreating spirit)./78/ If one compares the vivid personiÞcation of Yahweh's wisdom in Proverbs 8 as his partner in creation it is perhaps not inconceivable that the spirit could have been similarly thought of by the author of Genesis 1 as another 'person' within the divine being./79/ Certainly the spirit is in a number of places depicted as distinct from Yahweh (e.g. the spirit of Yahweh in Judges).
I do not press this point, and my general approach to the concept of the image is not dependent on it. The transition from the plural 'let us' to the singular 'God created' creates no difÞculty on this view, since the spirit, though capable of being distinguished from Yahweh, is nevertheless God, µyhla, divine.
3. The Image of God: Philological Considerations
We must look afresh at the precise way in which the image concept is expressed, and consider whether the usual translation of the text is justiÞable.
1. It is clear that the key term is µlx 'image'; the word twmd 'likeness' has an explanatory signiÞcance but it is not essential to the concept, for it does not need to be repeated after 'in his image', 'in the image of God'./80/ It cannot be denied that the most natural meaning for the phrase µyhla µlxb is 'in the image of God', that is, that God has an image, and that humanity is created in conformity with this image. The beth in µlxb is then a beth of the norm,/81/ and the word is to be translated 'according to the pattern, or model, of our image'. Such an image would normally, speaking from the point of view of ancient Near Eastern thought, be conceived of as (a) physical form, but we can also examine the possibility that the image is to be understood metaphorically as (b) a spiritual quality or character.
(a) Has God an 'image', then, in this sense, according to the Old Testament?/82/ There is no denying that God is recurrently spoken of in the Old Testament as if he were a human being: parts of the human body, such as hands, eyes, ears, are attributed to him, as also physical actions such as laughing, smelling, whistling; he is also spoken of as feeling the emotions of hatred, anger, joy, regret./83/ Such anthropomorphisms cannot easily be dismissed as merely metaphors,/84/ since everywhere else in the ancient Near East these terms were understood to be literally true of the gods, and it is difÞcult to believe that Israel would have run the risk to faith of using such terminology if it had believed that Yahweh was pure spirit, without parts or passions. Nevertheless, it is signiÞcant that the anthropomorphisms used of Yahweh in the Old Testament do not enable us to construct an identikit picture of Yahweh's physical appearance,/85/ as is the case, for example, with Greek deities described in Homer, but rather they concentrate attention on the personhood of Yahweh. Yahweh is depicted in human terms, not so much because he has a body like a human being, but because he is a person and is therefore naturally thought of in terms of human personality./86/
In addition to the numerous anthropomorphisms, whose theological signiÞcance is not entirely unambiguous, the Old Testament provides us with some more direct statements concerning Yahweh's 'form'. When Israel stood before Yahweh at Horeb, they 'heard the sound of words, but saw no form (hnwmt)' (Deut. 4.12). Second Isaiah asks: 'To whom then will you liken God, or what likeness (twmd) compare with him?' (Isa. 40.18). Nevertheless, it might be possible that Yahweh could have a form, though it remained hidden from the eyes of humans./87/ Ezek. 1.26 would suggest this: 'Seated above the likeness of a throne was a likeness as it were of a human form'. G. von Rad comments on this statement: 'The light-phenomenon of the "glory of God" clearly displays human contours'./88/ On the other hand, we should notice the extreme hesitation with which Ezekiel phrases his description of God;/89/ he does not say that he saw a human form, but only a 'likeness' (twmd) 'like the appearance' (harmk) of a human, that is to say, the divine appearance is at two removes from human form. Other celestial objects in his vision are described as the 'likeness' (twmd) of their earthly counterparts: the living creatures are only the 'likeness' of living creatures (v. 4), the throne is only the 'likeness' of a throne (v. 26); but on the throne is seated not the likeness of a human, but only the likeness of the appearance of a human. In v. 28 the appearance of Yahweh is described even more vaguely as 'the appearance of the likeness of the glory of Yahweh (hwhyAdwbk twmd harm)'. Isaiah also in vision 'sees' Yahweh upon his throne (Isa. 6.1), but no description of any appearance of Yahweh is here given. In summary, it would seem that when Yahweh is seen in vision, some 'appearance' (harm) is described, yet there is no real twmd 'likeness, conÞguration' that can be described, nor any µlx 'image, shape'./90/
When Yahweh appears to humans in theophanies he is indeed seen in human form (e.g. Gen. 18), yet there is no suggestion that this form is anything but a form that Yahweh has assumed for the sake of a temporary manifestation./91/ A hesitation to identify the human form with Yahweh himself is suggested by the use of the Þgure of the 'angel of the Lord', who, it frequently transpires, is none other than Yahweh.
The relation of the prohibition of images in the second commandment to the question of the 'formlessness' of Yahweh is problematic;/92/ but it seems clear that even if some view of the spirituality and formlessness of Yahweh was not responsible for the commandment, the prohibition of material images in Israel must have operated powerfully in promoting acceptance of the non-physical, inimitable, character of the divine nature. If an image of God must not be made, the explanation may naturally be offered that it is impossible to do so since God is formless. Such is the line of argument explicit in Deut. 4.15-18: 'Since you saw no form (hnwmt) on the day that the Lord spoke to you at Horeb out of the midst of the Þre, beware lest you act corruptly by making a graven image for yourselves, in the form of any Þgure (lmsAlk tnwmt), the likeness (tynbt) of male and female, the likeness of any beast . . . winged bird . . . anything that creeps on the ground . . . any Þsh'.
A not inconsiderable difÞculty for the interpretation of the µlx as the physical form of Yahweh is the fact that both male and female are said to have been created 'in the image of God'. Can this mean that God's µlx includes both male and female characteristics?/93/ Is there any signiÞcance in the fact that when God appears in a theophany, it is always a male form that is seen?
In answer to our question, then, whether in the Old Testament God has a 'form' according to which he could make humanity, we Þnd that although the evidence is not entirely unambiguous, various lines of thought point toward a conception of God as without any such form. H.H. Rowley has remarked: 'In the teaching of the Old Testament God is nowhere conceived of as essentially of human form. Rather he is conceived of as pure spirit, able to assume a form rather than as having in himself a physical form.'/94/ We may query the expression 'conceived of as pure spirit' as difÞcult to substantiate from the Old Testament,/95/ yet the basic point in Rowley's statement is God's formlessness, which does not indeed imply his disability to assume a form when he wishes to 'let himself appear'./96/ We may indeed go further, with J. Barr, and note that when Yahweh does appear in a form, the human form is the natural and characteristic one for him to assume. Nevertheless, 'thoughts of God appearing in human shape are by no means naturally reversible into thoughts of man sharing the shape of God'./97/
(b) To turn to the second possible interpretation of the image, if the beth of wnmlxb is taken as beth of the norm, could the image be understood metaphorically, as referring to some quality or characteristic of the divine nature on the pattern of which humanity is made?
We mention Þrst the fact that µlx and its cognates in other Semitic languages are used predominantly in a literal sense, of three-dimensional objects that represent gods, humans or other living beings./98/ Within the Old Testament, slightly more than half the usages of µlx are clearly in reference to such physical objects, viz. nine times in six contexts./99/ Only eight usages of µlx, in Þve contexts, could be regarded as not referring to a three-dimensional image, and even this number may be reduced since it includes: µlx as a two-dimensional representation, relief or drawing (Ezek. 23.14-15), µlx as Adam's image (Gen. 5.3), which almost all would agree involves a physical reference, and the few problematic usages (Gen. 1.26, 27 [bis]; 9.6) in reference to the image of God (here counted as one context). Thus we are reduced to two usages, in two contexts (Ps. 39.7; 73.20), in which a non-physical sense of µlx seems likely./100/
The word µlx therefore appears to be used occasionally in a metaphorical sense. The fact that O(s,.)lm in Nabataean or Old South Arabian has only a concrete meaning 'statue' is not particularly relevant to our enquiry, since in these languages no literary texts, in which alone a metaphorical meaning for µlx may have been expected, are extant. In the case of the one language that both uses a cognate of µlx and has a literature sufÞciently ancient and extensive to be adequately compared with the Old Testament, Akkadian, the word O(s,.)almu is used a number of times with a metaphorical meaning./101/
Yet if we examine the metaphorical meanings both of Hebrew µlx and Akkadian O(s,.)almu we Þnd that the idea of shape or conÞguration or Þgure is still prominent.
Thus in Ps. 73.20 the wicked who have been destroyed by God are said to be 'like a dream when one awakes: on awaking you despise their images' (µmlx) or 'phantoms' (rsv). Here the µlx is indeed an insubstantial non-physical object, a dream-image;/102/ yet it is recognizably the shape or conÞguration of something. Ps. 39.7 is more obscure: 'Surely humans go about as a shadow' (µlxb) (rsv);/103/ in the light of the parallelism of µlx with lbh 'breath' (v. 6a), a word that expresses the vanity and unsubstantiality of life, we may translate: 'Surely humans go around as a dream-image', an insubstantial will-o'-the-wisp, which has appearance and form, but not much else. The idea of shape is also present in metaphorical uses of O(s,.)almu in Akkadian. In the Gilgamesh Epic we read: 'How alike to the dead is one who sleeps! Do they not both draw the image of death?',/104/ i.e. 'Do they not both look alike?'/105/ Elsewhere in the same text phrase 'the form (O(s,.)almu) of his body' occurs;/106/ although the text is damaged at this point, there is a clear reference to the shape of a human body. We may be compare the Babylonian name O(S,.)almu-pap.me (= a, i.e. 'likeness of (his dead) brothers', where the physical appearance of a child is compared with that of his brothers now dead. O(S,.)almu is also used for 'constellation', i.e. the outline or conÞguration of a group of stars.
We may conclude that, even in the more metaphorical uses of µlx and its cognate O(s,.)almu, the idea of physical shape and form is present. No example remotely matches the meaning µlx would have in Gen. 1.26 if it referred there to God's spiritual qualities or character, according to the pattern of which humanity has been made./107/ It is possible that we should have here a vivid metaphor unparalleled elsewhere, but the linguistic evidence would suggest that it is most unlikely that µlx means anything here but a form, Þgure, object, whether three- or two-dimensional.
So what is at Þrst sight the most obvious meaning of µyhla µlxb, 'according to God's image', is very probably not the correct meaning, and we should look in another direction for the clue to its signiÞcance.
2. A much more satisfactory interpretation for the phrase appears to me to be supplied if we understand the beth here as the beth of essence (beth essentiae), meaning 'as', 'in the capacity of'./108/ The classic example of such a use of beth is Exod. 6.3: ydv lab araw 'and I appeared as (beth) El Shaddai', i.e. 'in my capacity, nature, as God Almighty'. The use of beth, though apparently out of accord with the usual meaning of beth 'in'/109/ and admittedly rather uncommon in Hebrew, is accepted without hesitation by grammarians, and has indeed been proposed by a number of scholars in the interpretation of Gen. 1.26./110/
Some objections have been made, however, to taking the beth of wnmlxb as beth essentiae.
First, it has been argued that in other examples of the phrase hc[ + accusative + b, the noun prefixed by b is the standard according to which a thing is constructed, and that this usage is decisive for the interpretation of wnmlxb µda hc[n./111/ There appear to be only two occurrences of such a phrase: Exod. 25.40 'And see that you make them after the pattern for them (µtynbtb), which is being shown you on the mountain'; Exod. 30.32 'You shall make no other like it in composition (wtnktmb)'. But it is plain that the meaning of b in such a phrase depends upon the meaning of the noun to which it is preÞxed, and upon the general context. There is nothing in the phrase hc[ + accusative + b in itself which Þxes the meaning of b. A quite different example of hc[ + accusative + b may be given: Judg. 21.15 'And the people had compassion on Benjamin because the Lord had made (hc[) a breach in (b) the tribes of Israel' .b here, of course, has its normal meaning of 'in, among', or perhaps 'upon'.
It is true, nevertheless, that there do not appear to be any examples in the Old Testament of hc[ + accusative + beth essentiae. The usual construction following hc[ is either two accusatives, or one accusative and l (e.g. Gen. 27.9; Judg. 8.27). However, both these constructions may well be felt to be unsuitable for expressing the meaning 'Let us make humanity as our image'. Both contain the idea of making a thing into what it was not before; wnmlxl µda hc[n or µda hc[n wnmlx might suggest 'let us make the (already existing) humanity into our image'. There appears, in short, to be no other concise way of saying 'Let us make humanity, with the intention that it should be our image' than the construction that has been used; it is a mere accident that there are not other examples of the same construction with hc[.
There are examples, moreover, with similar verbs, which make it possible to regard the present expression as in conformity with the use of the language: (i) Num. 18.26 'The tithes that I have given (yttn) you as (b) your inheritance';/112/ (ii) Ps. 78.55 'He drove out the nations before them; he apportioned them (µlypy) as (b) a line of inheritance', that is, 'as a measured inheritance';/113/ (iii) Deut. 1.13 'Choose wise . . . men, and I will appoint them (µmyca) as (b) your heads'./114/
The second objection to understanding wnmlxb as 'as our image' is that it is immediately followed by wntwmdk, which means 'like us', and so would not be strictly equivalent to wnmlxb; k is a comparative particle, and therefore, it is argued, the b of wnmlxb must bear a similar meaning./115/ It may be replied that there is no reason why wnmlxb and wntwmdk should be equivalent, and a perfectly satisfactory interpretation is gained by taking wnmlxb as 'as our image, to be our image' and wntwmdk not as synonymous with wnmlxb, but as explanatory of the 'image', that it is an image made wntwmdk, 'according to our likeness, like us'.
A third and similar objection to taking the beth of wnmlxb as beth essentiae is that no sure distinction can be established between b and k especially in Hebrew of the supposed date of 'P'. The freedom with which the prepositions are used in the passages under consideration:Gen. 1.26 wntwmdk, wnmlxb
1.27 µyhla µlxb, wnmlxk
5.1 µyhla twmdb
5.3 wmlxk wtwmdb
9.6 µyhla µlxbmakes it impossible, it is argued, to draw any conclusions from the choice of the particular preposition./116/ To this we may reply: (i) From the point of view of method, when we suspect that two terms are synonymous, we ought to examine whether any difference of meaning can be established between them. The fact that their meanings overlap does not prove that they are always synonymous. (ii) Consequently, we must ask whether the variation between b and k may not be exegetically grounded. I hope to show below that a satisfactory exegetical reason exists for the aberrant use of the prepositions in 5.1, 3./117/ (iii) When the reference is to the image of God and not to Adam's image (5.3), the preposition with µlx is always b. I suggest that this is not accidental. (iv) The confusion in meaning between b and k, which, one must admit, exists to some extent in biblical Hebrew, can operate in two directions. It need not mean that b must be of a b of comparison or norm; it could perhaps be that the b is virtually a kaph essentiae./118/ (v) The confusion between b and k has been established most clearly for Hebrew of the exile and later. While the usual literary analysis assigns the document 'P' to such a date, it is doubtful whether the priestly tradition enshrined in Genesis 1 attained its present form so late as the postexilic period./119/ We have moreover, in the case of the statements about the image of God, one piece of evidence that clearly suggests an early date, namely the occurrence of the phrase µyhla µlxb within a complex that bears the marks of ancient legal terminology (Gen. 9.6)./120/ It is inconceivable that the two halves of the verse did not originally belong together, since v. 6a is fully intelligible only in the light of v. 6b./121/ It is possible that we have in Gen. 9.6 the earliest statement of the image concept; it is signiÞcant that the preposition b is used here, and that here, perhaps even more than in the other references to the µyhla µlx, the translation 'as the image of God' affords the best interpretation.
A fourth objection to the interpretation of wnmlxb as 'as our image' arises from suggested Babylonian parallels in which a man or a god is created according to the image in the mind of the creator-god. Some have thought that a similar picture may lie behind Gen. 1.26./122/
Thus in the Epic of Gilgamesh, the nobles of the city of Uruk, oppressed by the riotous Gilgamesh, cry out to the goddess Aruru, the creator of Gilgamesh, to create another man like him, who may be able to subdue him.'Thou, Aruru, didst create [the man];
Create now his double [zikru];
His stormy heart let him match.
Let them contend, that Uruk may have peace!'
When Aruru heard this,
A double [zikru] of Anu she conceived within her.
Aruru washed her hands,
Pinched off clay and cast it on the steppe.
[On the step]pe she created valiant Enkidu,
offspring of . . . , essence of Ninurta./123/The term zikru also occurs in the myth of the Descent of Ishtar:
Ea in his wise heart conceived an image [zikru]
And created AO(s,.)uO(s,)u-namir, a eunuch./124/A similar term is used in Enuma elish:
Yea, Anshar's Þrst-born, Anu, was his equal.
Anu begot in his image [tamO(s,)O(,)lu] Nudimmud./125/The meaning of zikru is unfortunately much in dispute; its usual meaning is 'name' or 'command', but although some have endeavoured to see such a meaning here,/126/ most have preferred to Þnd a different word zikru here, meaning 'image, double, idea'./127/ If this is correct, we are a long way from µlx with its concrete reference. Zikru and tamO(s,)O(,)lu are if anything closer to twmd than to µlx./128/ Had O(s,.)almu been used in these passages there would have been a stronger case for doubting that we are dealing with beth essentiae in Gen. 1.26.
It should be also noted that, unlike Genesis 1, the passages from the Gilgamesh Epic and the Descent of Ishtar do not concern the creation of humankind, but of a particular man for a speciÞc purpose; the passage from Enuma elish does not concern the creation of humanity, but the begetting of a god. There is therefore little reason to see any connection between these passages and Genesis 1./129/
This survey of the objections which have been raised to the understanding of beth in wnmlxb as beth essentiae has shown them to be far from cogent; I conclude that Gen. 1.26 is to be translated 'Let us make humanity as our image' or 'to be our image', and the other references to the image are to be interpreted similarly. Thus we may say that according to Genesis 1 humanity does not have the image of God, nor is it made in the image of God, but is itself the image of God.
4. The Image of God in the Ancient Near East
We may now examine what meaning the statement that humanity is the image of God could have had for the author of Genesis 1.
The meaning of the image cannot be satisfactorily deduced from the Old Testament, because Old Testament in general was strongly opposed to the use of images and no rationale for images can be found in its pages. In order to discover the meaning of the image, we must Þnd what it signiÞed to those who worshipped images and thus held beliefs about the nature of images.
1. In the ancient Near East, as K.-H. Bernhardt has shown in his monograph Gott und Bild, the primary function of the image was to be the dwelling-place of spirit or þuid that derived from the being whose image it was./130/ This þuid was not immaterial, but was usually conceived of as a Þne, rariÞed, intangible substance that could penetrate ordinary coarse matter, so it is often spoken of as 'breath' or 'Þre'. Images of the dead were dwellings for the souls or spirits of the dead, for whom, especially in Egypt, the provision of a permanent body was an indispensable prerequisite for peace in the afterlife. Images of the gods were of two kinds: the plastic form and the living person, usually the king. 'The decisive thing in the image of the god is not the material nor the form, but the divine þuid, which inspires the image in that it takes up its abode in the image.'/131/ Thus in the Egyptian text known as the Memphite Theology, we read that after Ptah had formed the gods and had made cities 'the gods entered into their bodies of every (kind of) wood, of every (kind of) stone, of every (kind of) clay, or anything which might grow upon him [Ptah, as the 'rising land'], in which they had taken form'./132/ Osiris is depicted as coming as spirit in order to descend upon his image in his shrine and thus unite himself with his form./133/ It is precisely this belief, that images possess the divine þuid or spirit or breath, which Old Testament polemic denies by its claim that there is no 'spirit' in idols (Hab. 2.19; Jer. 10.14; 51.17).
A human being could also be the dwelling-place of a deity. Religious persons, such as priests and prophets, could be temporarily possessed by a deity, and even a sick person could be indwelt by a deity in place of a malevolent demon./134/ But of greater importance is the Þgure of the king, who was regarded at certain times in certain places as the life-long incarnation of the god. Of the Egyptian king F. Preisigke wrote that he 'is bearer of the divine þuid in its greatest potency . . . The visible and tangible body of the king is only the covering for the god or the dwelling of the god. The king's words and acts are expressions of the god dwelling in him.'/135/
If the essential thing in the image is its possession of the divine þuid, its representational quality as a likeness of the deity or the human being must play a secondary role. Images are in fact by no means always representational portrayals; many images of great antiquity were unhewn lumps of rock or other non-pictorial objects, and the Akkadian word O(s,.)almu can refer not only to representational portrayals, but also to mere stelae without the depiction of any form./136/ Bernhardt perhaps minimizes the representational character of the image; the obvious fact that most images do in fact look like something cannot be utterly insigniÞcant, but must reþect some attempt to conform the appearance of the image to the supposed appearance of the being whose spirit it bears, and shares. Yet we may agree that the degree of similarity to the being that is represented is of quite secondary importance; for images are 'not an illustration of faith, but the object of faith'./137/
As bearer of spirit, the image is consistently regarded and treated as a living being. After it has been completed by the workman, the image is ritually brought to life by touching its mouth, eyes and ears with magical instruments. The image of a god in a temple has a daily routine. In Egypt the day begins with the call of the priest to the image, 'Wake in joy!' The little chapel in which the image has been shut up for the night is opened. In Babylonia also images are awoken, dusted and washed, sometimes bathed in the sea; then a large breakfast is brought to the image, and so the day continues. An injury done to the image is a crime against the deity and is punished as such; hence images were seldom destroyed in war, but rather carried into captivity, where the image still remained a deity./138/
Statues of kings also would appear to have some spiritual link with the rulers they represent, although our evidence for the treatment of royal statues is slender beside that concerning divine statues. We do know that Assyrian kings set up their statues in territories they had conquered;/139/ though this of itself need not mean anything more than a desire for self-advertisement, when the normal function of an image as bearer of spirit is recognized, it becomes likely that the signiÞcance of a royal statue is that it represents the king's present occupation of the conquered land. To revile the royal image is as treasonable an act as to revile the king himself./140/ Kings have statues of themselves set up in temples in order to represent their perpetual attitude of supplication to their deity./141/ The image is no mere symbolic portrayal of the king, but stands in a spiritual union with him./142/
2. One further set of ancient Near Eastern data that is relevant to our enquiry has been mentioned only in passing, namely references to living human beings, usually the king, as the image of God.
Several such references occur in Mesopotamian literature.
The seventh-century Assyrian king, Esarhaddon, is addressed by one of his correspondents, the astrologer and court-ofÞcial Adad-shum-ußur, as the image of Bel:The father of the king, my lord, was the very image (O(s,.)almu) of Bel, and the king, my lord, is likewise the very image of Bel./143/
In another letter Adad-shum-uO(s,.)ur calls Esarhaddon the image of Shamash:
Whoever mourns for Shamash, the king of the gods, mourns for a day, a whole night, and again two days. The king, the lord of countries, is the (very) image (O(s,.)almu) of Shamash; for half a day only should he put on mourning./144/
To Esarhaddon the same writer expresses the wish that people may repeat concerning him the proverbial saying:
A (free) man is as the shadow of god, the slave is as the shadow of a (free) man; but the king, he is like unto the (very) image (muO(s,)O(s,)ulu) of god./145/
About the same period the astrologer Asharidu the Greater (or Elder) addresses an unnamed Assyrian king:
O king, thou art the image of Marduk, when thou art angry, to thy servants!/146/
In a ritual exorcism we read:
The exorcism (which is recited) is the exorcism of Marduk, the priest is the image (O(s,.)almu) of Marduk./147/
These examples appear to constitute the sum total of known Mesopotamian references to humans as the image of God; there may be some common link between them, possibly through the use of the term O(s,.)almu 'constellation' in astrology./148/ They are certainly not widely separated in time or place. We may here pause only to note that in all but one example it is the king who is the image of God.
When we turn to Egypt, however, we Þnd a wide variety of forms in which the concept appears in reference to the king./149/ In the New Kingdom, especially in the 18th Dynasty (16th century bce), the pharaoh is entitled 'image of Re', 'holy image of Re', 'living image on earth', 'image of Atum', etc. Two terms are used, mtj w and twt, which do not appear to be differentiated; they are used separately and together. This terminology continued to be used as late as the Greek period.
It is of interest that the pharaoh is several times said to have been begotten or created by the god whose image he is: he isthe shining image of the lord of all and a creation of the gods of Heliopolis . . . [H]e has begotten him, in order to create a shining seed on earth, for salvation for men, as his living image./150/
Amosis I is:A prince like Re, the child of Qeb, his heir, the image of Re, whom he created, the avenger (or the representative), for whom he has set himself on earth./151/
Amenophis III is addressed by the god Amon as:
My living image, creation of my members, whom Mut bare to me.
Amon-Re says to Amenophis III:
You are my beloved son, who came forth from my members, my image, whom I have put on earth. I have given to you to rule the earth in peace.
The application of the phrase 'image of God' to a human person in the foregoing texts enables us to conclude, with particular reference to Egypt, that it is the king who is the image of God, not humankind generally./152/ The image of the god is associated very closely with rulerhood. The king as image of the god is his representative. The king has been created by the god to be his image.
5. The Image of God in the Old Testament
The meaning of the image of God in Genesis 1 cannot be understood without reference to the signiÞcance of the image in the ancient Near East. Not every aspect of that signiÞcance is transferable to the Hebrew thought-world, but, as so often, Old Testament belief lays under tribute other ancient thought and freely borrows anything that is not incompatible with faith in Yahweh. We may therefore consider in what ways the Old Testament meaning of the image may be illumined by reference to ancient Near Eastern attitudes to the image.
1. The image is a status in the round, a three-dimensional object. The human person according to the Old Testament is a psychosomatic unity;/153/ it is therefore the corporeal animated person that is the image of God./154/ The body cannot be left out of meaning of the image; the person is a totality, and its 'solid þesh' is as much the image of God as its spiritual capacity, creativeness, or personality, since none of these 'higher' aspects of the human being can exist in isolation from the body. The body is not a mere dwelling-place for the soul, nor is it the prison-house of the soul. In so far as the person is a body and a bodiless human is not human, the body is the image of God; for the person is the image of God. Humanity is the þesh-and-blood image of the invisible God. This is not to say that it is the body as opposed to something else, such as the spirit, that is the image of God. For the body is not 'opposed' to the spirit; indeed as far as the image is concerned at least, what the body is the spirit is. It is the homo, not the animus or the anima, that is the imago Dei./155/
The importance of this understanding of the image is obvious, in that the value of the body is strikingly afÞrmed. The body has been consistently depreciated in Christian theology, under the inþuence of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic conceptions of humanity as primarily nous, 'mind' or 'reason'. Nous has been regarded as that which is unique in humanity, being a universal and immortal principle that enters the human person from outside. Reinhold Niebuhr has analysed the consequences of this belief in the supremacy of nous and its concomitant body-soul dualism:/156/ (i) It identiÞes rational humanity with the divine, since reason is, as the creative principle, identical with God. The concept of the individuality of persons is insigniÞcant, since it rests only on the particularity of the body. (ii) It identiÞes the body with evil, assuming the essential goodness of mind or spirit. Thus we Þnd Augustine declaring in neo-Platonist style: 'For not in the body but in the mind was humanity made in the image of God. In his own similitude let us seek God, in his own image recognize the creator.'/157/
In biblical thought as represented by Genesis 1 a far higher value is set upon the body. The body is 'not an object which we possess, but which stands outside our real being . . . It is the living form of our essential self, the necessary expression of our individual existence, in which the meaning of our life must Þnd its realization.'/158/ The concept of the image is thus the protological counterpart of the eschatological concept of the resurrection of the body; like eschatology, protology (the concept of the beginning) is basically concerned to depict a truth of existential signiÞcance,/159/ in this case, that of the indivisible unity of human nature. In turn, this concept of the union of physical and spiritual in the nature of the human person has far-reaching implications in the sphere of humanity's relation with the world and with God, on the understanding of sin and redemption, on the validity and signiÞcance of the cult, on the development of the importance of the individual;/160/ but these broader issues can only be mentioned here.
As far as concerns this aspect of the image, namely that it denotes the corporeal existence of the human person, it needs to be stressed that what makes humanity the image of God is not that the corporeal person stands as an analogy of a corporeal God;/161/ for the image does not primarily mean similarity, but the representation of the one who is imaged in a place where he is not. If God wills his image to be corporeal humanity-union of physical and spiritual (or psychical)-he thereby wills the manner of his presence in the world to be the selfsame uniting of physical and spiritual. At this point, where the doctrine of the incarnation lies close at hand, together with the rejection of ultimate dichotomy between sacred and secular, we must leave the exploration of the repercussions of the image concept in so far as they stem from the corporeal aspect of the image.
2. Reference has already been made to the function of the image as representative of one who is really or spiritually present, though physically absent. The king puts his statue in a conquered land to signify his real, though not his physical, presence there. The god has his statue set up in the temple to signify his real presence there, though he may be in heaven, on the mountain of the gods, or located in some natural phenomenon, and so not physically present in the temple.
According to Gen. 1.26-27 humanity is set on earth in order to be the representative there of the absent God who is nevertheless present by his image. Throughout Genesis 1 the transcendence of God is Þrmly established; God stands outside the above the created order, and 'the only continuity between God and his work is the Word'/162/ (until v. 26, we should add). Unlike almost every other creation story of the ancient Near East, Genesis represents God as freely bringing the world into existence, not himself being generated from the world. Every element of the world order comes into being at his unconditioned command; even light is a mere creature, not an 'overþow of the essence of deity' as elsewhere./163/ The sea-monsters are no primordial chaos-beings subsisting in their own right, but the 'Þrst of the creation of God' (Job 40.19).
It is of the greatest theological moment therefore that precisely within this depiction of God's transcendent freedom over the whole world-order we Þnd the concept of God's image, that is to say, of the real presence, or immanence, of the deity within the world through the person of humans./164/ In this juxtaposition of two aspects of the divine nature the author of Genesis 1 has both freed God from bondage to the world-order by asserting the creaturehood of all that is not God, and has ensured that the statement about the immanence of God Þrmly excludes any possibility of humanity's divinization, for humans too are explicitly said to be creatures of God. The Old Testament does not see the relation of the transcendence and immanence of God as a problem, to be sure, yet there is considerable tension between statements of these two aspects. Here the polarities are merged in the conception of the transcendent God immanent through the human person./165/ We may therefore add to Bonhoeffer's dictum 'The only continuity between God and his work is the Word': 'But from the sixth day of creation onward humanity, the image of God, becomes the continuity'. In a sense, the Word becomes þesh. The word calls the creation into existence; but the image of God is the permanent link between God and his world.
By what means does the image represent the one it represents? What is the bond that unites the god and his image? The ancient Near East provides a clear answer to this question by its concept of the divine þuid or spirit that inspires the dead matter of the image with a principle of life. Genesis 1, on the other hand, would seem to be rather reticent on this subject; it draws our attention away from the mechanism of the image to the function of the image, namely rulerhood of the creation as God's vizier. This silence on the part of Genesis 1 need not have been so absolute, for Genesis 2 knows of an inbreathing of God's breath (hmvn) by which the created man became 'a living vpn' (v. 7). There the man is regarded as dead matter, dust of the earth, infused with divine breath or spirit./166/ The implication here is not that the man possesses some 'part' that is divine, for breath is not a 'part' of the man, but the principle of vitality itself, which remains in God's possession and may be withdrawn by him as he pleases./167/ Nevertheless, the concept of Þlling by the divine spirit was capable of being misunderstood as a suggestion that humanity is partly human, partly divine, like Gilgamesh, two-thirds god and one-third man./168/ Such a suggestion is far from the thought of Genesis 1; perhaps we have here, therefore, the reason for avoidance of this aspect of the image in Genesis 1./169/ For it is only a short step from recognizing the image to be indwelt by the divine spirit to divinization of the image and the paying of divine honours to it./170/ This was a step that Old Testament thought never took, for the gulf between God and humanity, though narrow at certain points, is an absolute one.
In spite of the apparent silence of Genesis 1 about the role of the spirit in the image, it is possible that the Spirit or breath of God as the vivifying element in humanity lies implicit here, as it is explicit in Genesis 2./171/ If God is addressing his spirit in 1.26 and summoning himself and his spirit to co-operate in the creation of the image, the mechanism of the image is explained. It becomes a genuine image of the deity by the infusion of divine spirit or breath. Not surprisingly, the author hesitated to spell out in clear terms a concept that could so easily be misinterpreted; and indeed his concern is chieþy with the function of the image, as the following verbs make clear. But he may have left us a hint, in the plural verb and noun sufÞxes, that humanity as the image of God is viviÞed by the divine spirit. Can we thus argue that the plural is here deliberately as a disclosure and at the same time a concealment of a 'difÞcult' concept?
3. The image is also very often, though not necessarily, a likeness of the one it represents. K.-H. Bernhardt has emphasized that the idea of similarity is an element of quite secondary importance in the meaning of the image: 'the possession of spirit is the one decisive thing for the religious worth of a divine image'./172/ The primary function of an image is to express, not to depict. Nevertheless, since an image frequently depicts something, even if only symbolically, we should take this function also into consideration when we are examining the meaning of the image.
That humanity is the image of God need not in itself imply any similarity between humanity and God, especially if, as we have argued above, there is no µlx of God on the pattern of which humanity could have been made. Thus it is very remarkable that Genesis 1 goes out of its way to stress that humanity is an image that is also a likeness, as well as a representative, of God-the term wntwmdk 'according to our likeness' being an ampliÞcation and speciÞcation of the meaning of the image.
We can hardly say that 'likeness' (twmd) strengthens the meaning of µlx,/173/ for an image that is also a likeness is not more of an image than one that bears no likeness to what it represents, since it is the representative quality that is the essential signiÞcance of the image. Yet we may say that the use of the term 'likeness' brings into sharper relief the claim that is made for humanity in this statement.
On this point I would differ from the great majority of scholars, who have either understood the abstract term twmd 'likeness' to be a weakening of the strong physical implication of the concrete term µlx 'image', or have denied that any distinction between the two terms may be discerned.
Those who believe that twmd 'weakens' the strong physical force of µlx have assumed that µlx by itself would signify humanity's creation according to the physical image of God, and that the author must therefore qualify this strong term by explaining that humanity is not an exact copy of God, only a 'likeness'./174/. But if we understand the µlx to signify humanity as the image and not to refer to some image God is supposed to possess, there is no reason why we should not understand it in a quite physical sense; twmd then speciÞes what kind of an image it is: it is a 'likeness'-image, not simply an image; it is representational, not simply representative.
Those on the other hand who deny that any distinction can be drawn between the terms µlx and twmd/175/ are often conscious of the fundamental error in the traditional Christian interpretation, by which the terms µlx and twmd were made to refer to entirely different things. This interpretation, which goes back to Irenaeus,/176/ understands the µlx to refer natural likeness to God (e.g. reason, free-will), twmd to supernatural likeness (e.g. moral excellence). This distinction between µlx and twmd is based ultimately on the insertion of kaiv by the lxx between the two terms: kat eijkovna hJmetevran kai; oJmoivwsin. This apparently insigniÞcant addition, which was carried over into the Vulgate as ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, encouraged exegetes to assign different content to the two terms, a procedure that can hardly be substantiated by the Hebrew text, especially in view of the omission of twmd in other statements about the divine image. Even the lxx and Vulgate may not have intended the two terms to be understood separately; it is very possible that they form a hendiadys./177/
In suggesting here that a difference in meaning can be established between the words µlx and twmd I am by no means asserting that they have different contents and refer to different elements in the image, but rather that the twmd refers entirely to the µlx; it has no referential meaning in itself, but only speciÞes the kind of image, namely a representational image./178/ We cannot discover from the text in what the likeness as distinct from the image may consist, and we can only assume that it has a force applicable to all the meanings of the image. The representational image in the ancient Near East is intended to portray the character of the god whose image it is; thus, for example, a fertility god may be represented by a bull. So in Genesis 1, humanity is not a mere cipher, chosen at random by God to be his representative, but to some extent also expresses, as the image, the character of God. The precise elements in the nature of God expressed by humanity may, however, not be determined by examining the term 'likeness', but only by concentrating attention upon the term 'image'. Gen. 1.26 speaks of humanity's likeness to God only in the senses in which an image is like the one it images.
4. The terminology of the image of God, when applied to a living person, is understood in the ancient Near East almost exclusively of the king. As in Mesopotamia, so also in Egypt, if a god is spoken of at all as being imaged in living human form, there is only one person who can be regarded as the image of the god, namely the king. He is already believed on other grounds to be closest of all humans to the realm of the divine, if he is not already, as in Egypt, a member of it. He alone has some claim to possession of divine spirit, so he is the natural dwelling-place of the god.
There are indeed one or two exceptions to the usual restriction of the term 'image' to the king. A priest is in one text called 'the image of Marduk' in Babylonia,/179/ but here it is probably only the notion of representation that is intended; it is heightened to an extreme degree by calling him an 'image', which is the most perfect type of representative known, since it is the only representative that is actually in spiritual union with the one it represents. The exorcism that the priest utters is really Marduk's exorcism, so the priest himself may for this purpose be identiÞed with Marduk as his image.
A more remarkable passage concerning the 'image of God' is found in the Egyptian text, the Instruction for King Meri-ka-Re, from the 22nd century bce:Well-directed are man, the cattle of the god. He made heaven and earth according to their desire, and he repelled the water-monster. He made the breath of life (for) their nostrils. They who have issued from his body are his images./180/
Here we have an unparalleled description of all humankind as the images of God. It would be tempting to regard it as an example of 'democratization' in the circles of wisdom-teaching,/181/ were it not for the fact that this text comes from a time several centuries earlier than the regular use of 'image of God' for the king.
There is not likely to be any direct relationship between this isolated reference to humankind as the image of God and the biblical text. However, there may with more probability be assumed to be some connection between the title 'image of God' for the Egyptian king and the term in Genesis 1; all the more so in the light of the important parallels between Egyptian cosmogony and Genesis 1 which until recently have been obscured by an exaggerated emphasis on a supposed Babylonian background of Genesis 1./182/ Even if the Genesis 1 concept of the image is not dependent upon the Egyptian or Babylonian title 'image of God' it is at least signiÞcant that whereas in the rest of the ancient Near East the image of God was limited to the king, in Genesis it is regarded as characteristic of humankind generally, without distinction between king and commoner, man and woman, or Israelite and non-Israelite.
That is to say, humankind is deÞned according to the divine summons of Gen. 1.26, which is constitutive for humanity's being, as 'the image of God', a term that denies any fundamental quality to the phenomenal difference between person and person./183/ Humankind everywhere is essentially the same. Every distinction between person and person is secondary to the fundamental standing of every person as the image of God.
Clearly, Israel failed to draw out the implications to any marked degree. The reason was not the late introduction of the concept into Israelite thought, for I have already suggested that it is much older than the supposed date of the source. Rather I would locate Israel's comparative disregard for the concept of the image in its implication that the distinction between Israelite and non-Israelite was secondary to humanity's underlying unity before God. Salvation-history in the Old Testament is the history of the salvation of Israel; the universalistic concept of the image of God militates to some extent against the particularism implicit in the concept of salvation-history, and so must be kept within close conÞnes for the sake of the validity of the salvation-history./184/ There is, however, one distinction between person and person that is speciÞcally denied by the text of Gen. 1.27 to be ultimate, namely the distinction between male and female. The image of God does not subsist in the male but in humankind generally. Thus the most basic statement about humanity, according to Genesis 1, that it is the image of God, is inclusive of both the sexes. E. Brunner has observed on the phrase 'male and female created he them': 'That is the immense double statement, of a lapidary simplicity, so simple indeed that we hardly realize that with it a vast world of myth and Gnostic speculation, of cynicism and asceticism, of the deiÞcation of sexuality and fear of sex completely disappears'./185/
5. It is the king who is the image of God; in virtue of his being the image of God he is ruler. Likewise in Genesis 1 the concept of humanity's rulership is connected in the strongest possible way with the idea of the image: 'Let us make humanity as our image according to our likeness, and let them have dominion over the Þsh of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth' (v. 26). Again we Þnd: 'So God created humanity as his own image . . . and God blessed them and said . . . "Be fruitful and multiply, and Þll the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the Þsh of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth" ' (vv. 27-28). Again in Psalm 8, which has been aptly termed the best commentary on Gen. 1.26,/186/ humanity's status is linked with kingship and dominion:/187/
Thou hast made him a little less than God,
and dost crown him with glory and honour.
Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands;
thou hast put all things under his feet,
all sheep and oxen,
and also the beasts of the Þeld,
the birds of the air, and the Þsh of the sea,
whatever passes along the paths of the sea (Ps. 8.5-8).The question which arises here is whether humanity's dominion over the animals is to be understood as deÞnitive of the image itself, or is merely a consequence of the image. Most modern scholars agree that the dominion is only a consequence of the image; even if it is the primary consequence, it is none the less not to be included within the image. It is often argued that support for this view is found in the special blessing of Gen. 1.28 in which humanity is directed to have dominion, as also in the possible translation of 1.26 'let us make humanity . . . and let them have dominion' (simple waw joining two co-ordinate jussives), which would suggest that being the image and having dominion are separate.
I agree that humanity's dominion over the animals cannot be deÞnitive of the image, for, as we have already seen, the image must include a number of elements and cannot be deÞned so narrowly. But since dominion is so immediate and necessary a consequence of the image, it loses the character of a mere derivative of the image and virtually becomes a constitutive part of the image itself.
From the exegetical point of view this opinion is justiÞable. Gen. 1.26 may well be rendered: 'Let us make humanity as our image . . . so that they may rule' (i.e. waw joining two jussives with Þnal force for the second)./188/ The transference in v. 28 of the thought of dominion to the context of a 'subsequent' blessing need not be understood as indicative of the purely consequential character of the dominion. In 1.6 'Let there be a Þrmament in the midst of the waters, and let it separate the waters from the waters' we have two commands (in form apparently co-ordinate jussives linked by simple waw), yet two acts of creation are not referred to; the Þrmament, in being a Þrmament in the midst of the waters, in fact is already separating waters above from waters below. If the second member of the sentence were not true, the Þrst could hardly be so; thus the second is not a mere consequence of the Þrst but draws out the permanent implication of the Þrst. Somewhat closer in form to 1.28 is 1.16-17: 'God made the two great lights . . . And God set them in the Þrmament of the heavens to give light on the earth and to rule over the day and night and to divide between light and darkness.' We cannot speak here of an initial act and its consequences, as though the making preceded the setting, which in turn brought about the giving of light and the ruling. Rather the act of creation of the sun and moon includes within itself the purpose that they are to serve. Their giving of light is not the same thing as their being set in the Þrmament, yet their being set there cannot be fully deÞned without reference to their function as luminaries. In the same way, though humanity's rulership over the animals is not itself the image of God, no deÞnition of the image is complete that does not refer to this function of rulership.
This conclusion can be conÞrmed on more general grounds. It is very likely that the ancient Near Eastern description of the king, especially in Egypt, as the image of God, formed part of the background to the phrase in Gen. 1.26. Ancient Near Eastern understanding of divine images has seemed very clearly to lie behind Gen. 1.26, and it may be further suggested that the idea of the king as the living image of God is a further element in the background of humanity as the image of God. Humanity is here described in royal terms,/189/ not only in the command to have dominion, but in the image of God phrase itself. The term 'image of God' in itself indicates the regal character of humanity, just as it does in Egypt, where only the king is image of God, and where his rulership is often speciÞcally associated with his being the image. Hence the command to have dominion (Gen. 1.26, 28) does not advertise some function of humanity that may or may not devolve from its being the image; humanity has dominion only because it is the image, and its being the image means, without any further addition, that it is already ruler.
The same conclusion is reached from a general view of Genesis 1. Here God is presented as sovereign Creator of the universe; since to make means to possess, he is therefore sovereign owner or lord of the world. As the image of such a deity humanity is made and rules the world in the place of God as his locum tenens or vizier. It is precisely because humanity is the image of the God of Genesis 1 that it is ruler; dominion is not some donum superadditum that is not intrinsic to the image.
Human dominion over the animals may seem to be a remarkably non-religious expression of humanity's spiritual status as the image of God. Perhaps also we Þnd this a rather uninteresting conclusion, for it is obvious to us that humans are superior to animals, however like them they may be in some respects. Nevertheless, this statement about humanity as master of the animals conveys more than at Þrst sight appears.
In other ancient Near Eastern thought the worlds of the gods, humanity and animals were inextricably intertwined. Humankind was as much a servant of animals, or at least of theriomorphic deities, as master of them. Genesis 1, by its precise structuring of the universe in which humanity stands between God and the animals,/190/ may be said to liberate humanity from the bondage that results from the divinization of the animal world./191/ Moreover, it empties the realm of the divine of its non-moral, sub-personal, animal elements. The concept of humanity as God's image is thus also a concept of the moral, personal, and non-animal, character of God./192/
The image concept is not, however, concerned to deny the links between humanity and the animals./193/ Humankind shares with them the day of its creation; and like them it is corporeal, bisexual, herbivorous, a created being. All that differentiates it from them and that elevates it above them, according to Genesis 1, is the role that God lays on humanity, to be his image. Were it not God's image, it would not be human, but a mere animal. But since it is God's image, no philosophical or psychological description of humanity, such as 'naked ape' or 'machine', which does not reckon with the image, can be a complete description of humanity.
We may go further with G. von Rad and observe that the animals of which humanity is bidden to have the mastery stand for the whole created order; they Þgure so prominently in the texts about the image because they are the only possible rivals to humanity./194/ Humankind is thus not simply master of the animals, but king of the earth.
It does not need to be stressed how vastly this Hebrew creation story, in which humankind is created to be ruler, differs from other ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies, in which humanity is created to be servant of the gods and to relieve them of their toil. The Atrahasis Epic provides a fair sample of Mesopotamian creation narratives:Create a human to bear the yoke.
Let him bear the yoke, the task of Enlil,
Let man carry the load of the gods./195/6. Once an image in the ancient Near East has become the dwelling-place of divine þuid, it remains the image of the god, regardless of the vicissitudes to which it is subjected. The Egyptian king is constantly the image of God until the moment of his death, when he is re-united with the god whose image he was while on earth.
In Genesis also humanity remains, from the moment of its creation, the image of God. The mere parallel with the ancient Near Eastern conception of the image would not be sufÞcient to conÞrm this view, but the biblical texts that speak of the image put it beyond question.
We note Þrst that the image is what is said of humanity in general, not of the Þrst humans. Humankind is created in order to be God's image, and no hint is given that it has ceased to be the image of God. There can be no question, therefore, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, of a 'loss' of the image./196/ When the image is otherwise deÞned than has been done in the present essay there may be some justiÞcation for speaking of the loss of the image; it would be possible to start, as Luther apparently did, from the premise that the image is lost, and consequently to deÞne the image negatively, in terms of what humanity is not. Such a method indeed ensures the conÞrmation of the original premise, but it does not do justice to Gen. 1.26 or the other texts that speak of the image.
In defending the view that the image is not lost, a view that is shared by all modern Old Testament scholars, we should not lay much weight on Genesis 5, as is done by many exegetes, for there we are not dealing with the transmission of the divine image, but with the begetting of a son in Adam's image. Genesis 9, however, which concerns not simply the post-Fall but the post-Flood world, affords no indication of a loss, or even a partial defacement of the image. Rather, the primaeval creation of humanity as the image of God is regarded as having contemporary validity, in that it is used as a warning against murder and as validation of capital punishment. In Psalm 8, also, it is taken for granted that the image (which is indeed not explicitly mentioned, but is alluded to by the description of humanity's rulerhood) is to be seen here and now in humankind. The permanence of the image is a concept that persists even in the New Testament: for Paul, in 1 Cor. 11.7, humanity is the image and so the glory of God; Jas 3.9 speaks of the inconsequentiality of using the same member of the body, the tongue, both to bless God and to curse humans, 'who are made in the image of God'. This lively contrast would lack all point if James did not believe that humans are still the image of God.
The same conclusion regarding the permanent validity of the image may be drawn from consideration of the term 'humanity' (µda) in Gen. 1.26-27. Genesis 1 does not describe the creation of the ancestors of each species of life, but rather the creation of the various species. The whole human race is in view therefore in Gen. 1.26-27, not a primaeval pair./197/
Thus humanity, so long as it remains human, is the image of God, for it is the human race that is made the image of God. As K. Barth puts it, '[The image] does not consist in anything that man is or does. It consists in the fact that man himself and as such is God's creation. He would not be man, were he not the image of God. He is God's image, in that he is man.'/198/
In summary, the concept of the image of God may be formulated thus:
Humankind is created not in God's image, since God has no image of his own, but as God's image, or rather to be God's image, that is to deputize in the created world for the transcendent God who remains outside the world order. That humanity is God's image means that it is the visible corporeal representative of the invisible, bodiless God; humanity is representative rather than representation, since the idea of portrayal is secondary in the signiÞcance of the image. However, the term 'likeness' is an assurance that humanity is an adequate and faithful representative of God on earth. The whole person is the image of God, without distinction of spirit and body. All humankind, without distinction, are the image of God. The image is to be understood not so much ontologically as existentially: it comes to expression not in the nature of humanity so much as in its activity and function. This function is to represent God's lordship to the lower orders of creation. The dominion of humanity over creation can hardly be excluded from the content of the image itself. Humankind, which means both the human race and individual persons, does not cease to be the image of God so long as it remains human; to be human and to be the image of God are not separable.
6. The Image of God in the New Testament
The concept that humanity is the image of God, made in the likeness of God, is still to be found in the New Testament, in the two passages in 1 Corinthians and James we have already noted.
Yet when we review the expressions eijkwvn, oJmoivwsi~, morfhv, carakthvr and the like in the New Testament,/199/ all of which are related to the concept of the image, we Þnd that by far the greatest weight in the New Testament concept of the image lies upon the Þgure of Christ as the true image of God. As the second man, the last Adam, Jesus is to perfection the image of God. From Christ, 'who is the likeness of God', streams 'the gospel light of Christ's glory', which is hidden to unbelievers; but believers see the 'light of the knowledge of God's glory in the face of Christ' (2 Cor. 4.4-6). He is 'the image of the invisible God' (Col. 1.15); he is also the Þrstborn of all creation, i.e. the image of God, who is Son of God ('beloved son', Col. 1.13), and to whom authority over all created things is given. Genesis 1 has presented themes of continuity between God and the world through his word and his image; both themes are taken up in the New Testament: in John 1, Christ as the Logos is the continuity; in Hebrews 1 Christ is the image, who 'reþects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his character', and who is also Son and Þrstborn and word ('has spoken to us by a Son').
As the second Adam, Christ is the head of the new humanity; therefore as Adam shares the image with his descendants, so Christ shares the image with his descendants, namely those that are 'in Christ'. 'Those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his son, in order that he might be the Þrstborn among many brethren' (Rom. 8.29). It is the image of Christ, rather than the image of God, that comes to the forefront when conformity with the image is spoken of.
Bearing the image of Christ is an eschatological concept; it contains elements both of the now and the not yet. 'We are God's children now, but it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he appears we shall be like him' (1 Jn 3.2). 'Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven' (1 Cor. 15.49). Complete conformity with the image of Christ is not yet attained but already 'as we behold the glory of the Lord as are being changed into the same likeness from one degree of glory to another' (2 Cor. 3.18).
The protological concept of the image, which retains its existential implications, has become transformed in the New Testament into an eschatological concept itself with existential implications; for example, 'He that has this hope [of eventual likeness to Christ] in him puriÞes himself' (1 Jn 3.3). Humanity is God's representative on earth; Christ in a further sense is God's 'one' representative on earth and the community of believers becomes the dwelling-place of God on earth. Just as humanity's creation as image of God spells the equality of all before God, so within the community of the new humanity there can be no divisions of race or class: 'You have put on the new humanity, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator. Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free, but Christ is all and in all' (Col. 3.10-11; cf. Gal. 3.28). Humankind is still lord of creation, and Psalm 8 is still true, yet in a fuller sense, as Hebrews 2 reminds us, 'we do not yet see everything in subjection to him' (2.8). Here is the tension of the new age, between the now and the not yet. The hope that the not yet will presently become the now lies in the next verse, 'But we see Jesus, for a little while made lower than the angels, crowned with glory and honour'.
In Christ, according to the Pauline view, humanity sees what humanity was meant to be./200/ In Genesis, all humanity is the image of God; in Paul, where Christ is the one true image, humanity is image of God so far as it is like Christ. For him, this is how humanity, already the image of God, can become fully human, fully the image of God./